讲座预告 | 管理学院管理学与经济学系列前沿讲座之三八一七讲

讲座题目:Menu mechanisms

主讲嘉宾:周愚 早稻田大学高等研究所讲师 

讲座时间:2019年9月27日(周五)15:00-17:30

主持人:陈斌副教授 中山大学管理学院

讲座地点:管理学院善思堂M201

主办单位:“战略与创业创新”科研团队

 

嘉宾简介

周愚,现任早稻田大学高等研究所讲师,美国《数学评论》评论员。本科硕士毕业于南京大学经济学系,博士毕业于日本大阪大学经济学研究科,获理论经济学博士学位。目前研究方向为市场设计,拍卖理论,博弈论以及公共经济学。

 

讲座摘要

Many important dynamic mechanisms are menu mechanisms, where at each history an agent selects from a menu of his possible assignments. We investigate when a menu mechanism and a convention| which species a strategy for each agent given his type | together form an ex-post perfect implementation of a rule. We find that if (i) each agent's possible preferences over his assignments include all strict rankings; (ii) the rule is strategy-proof, (iii) an agent can never select an assignment twice along any play; (iv) the convention species that each agent always selects a most-preferred assignment, and that subject to this he breaks ties consistently; and (v) the rule's outcome is always reached when agents follow the convention; then we have an ex-post perfect implementation of the rule (Theorem 1). If, moreover, preferences are always strict and the rule is group strategy-proof, then we have a full subgame perfect implementation of the rule (Theorem 2). In the event of such double implementation, each ex-post perfect convention is compatible with the rule.