讲座题目：Controlling and Minority Shareholders Meeting Halfway? Evidence from Family Firms’Voluntary Information Disclosure on Foreign Direct Investment控股股东和小股东之间的折衷妥协？来自家族企业海外直接投资信息揭露的证据
主讲嘉宾：顾茜 （美国佐治亚州立大学J.Mack Robinson商学院助理教授）
主 持 人 ：李炜文副教授
顾茜为乔治亚州立大学助理教授。其研究兴趣包括家族企业、新兴市场企业战略和对外直接投资。她的研究成果发表在ASQ、SMJ和JIBS等国际顶级期刊上。顾茜助理教授为Journal of World Business和Management and Organization review等期刊的编委会成员。
How do firms respond to the diverging demands between controlling and minority shareholders? Utilizing family firms’ newly established foreign direct investment (FDI) as a natural laboratory, we propose that firms can reconcile these shareholder demands by strategizing their voluntary information disclosure. Specifically, firms can adopt a balanced approach by adjusting the amount of information disclosure and the contents of information disclosed. When there is a higher level of controlling family involvement, there will be a larger amount of information disclosure to satisfy the needs of minority shareholders on the one hand, and a lower ratio of socioemotional wealth (SEW) sensitive information disclosed to meet the demands of the controlling families on the other hand. Furthermore, this balanced approach is modified by the social norms in the host countries. A stronger norm of minority shareholder protection will strengthen the positive effect of controlling family involvement on the amount of information disclosure, and a stronger norm of family value preservation will weaken its influence on the ratio of SEW sensitive information disclosed. Using a sample of publicly listed family firms in China, we find empirical support for our theoretical predictions.