主 持 人：李炜文副教授
姜翰，博士毕业于亚利桑那州立大学，目前是亚利桑那大学Eller管理学院助理教授。他的研究兴趣包括社会网络、社会资本和公司治理。他的文章发表在Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Management, Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice等国际顶级管理和创业期刊。
Scholars have long recognized that executives are often dismissed after scandals. We extend this line of research by exploring the distinct implications of executives’ social capital for their dismissal following a scandal. Using firms’ financial fraud and executives’ personal indiscretion as examples, we highlight that the impact of social capital on dismissal in the wake of a scandal is largely determined by executives’ culpability. Based on a sample of public firms in China, our central finding is that while an executive’s social capital can help reduce the likelihood of being dismissed as a scapegoat following financial fraud, it becomes a liability for executives who engage in personal indiscretion, increasing the likelihood that firms will dismiss these compromised executives.